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ABSTRACT
It has been received wisdom for  some  time  that  some  statutory  definitions  of  harassment  and
discrimination embrace treatment on the ground of a third party’s race, or sex, etc, and ‘perceived’
discrimination, that is where the  discriminator  has  acted  on  a  mistaken  belief  that  the  victim
belonged to a protected group. What was less certain is whether the  definitions  could  embrace  a
scenario where the treatment was not grounded in anyone’s particular protected status, or where  a
worker was fired for his racial views. This article explores the precise meanings attributable to the
statutory formulas, and considers the recent Court of Appeal decisions  of  Redfearn  v  Serco  and
English v Sanderson. It concludes that there is an inconsistent  and  incoherent  range  of  statutory
formulas, some narrow, some broad, and some hybrid, and the cases are  decided  more  on  policy
and purpose than literal interpretation of these formulas.
MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS OF HARASSMENT AND DIRECT DISCRIMINATION
The UK’s statutory definitions of harassment and direct discrimination centre on the phrase on the
ground of. Domestic legislation carries two varieties of  this  phrase  for  harassment,  one  narrow
and one broad. To paraphrase, harassment is unlawful either  ‘on  grounds  of’  a  protected  status
(broad), or ‘on the ground of  his’  protected  status  (narrow).  It  is,  for  example,  the  difference
between ‘on the ground of race’, or ‘on the ground of  his  race’.  At  present,  the  UK  legislation
provides  a  broad  definition  for  race,  sexual  orientation,  and  religion  or  belief.  The   narrow
definition covers gender reassignment and age.  (For  sex,  the  harassment  need  only  be  related
to  her  sex,  an  even  broader  phrase  used  to  resolve  a  different  issue.[i])  There  is  a  similar
discrepancy for direct discrimination, save that for religion or belief there  is  a  hybrid  definition,
and for sex there is a narrow definition.
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 carries the narrow  definition  for  harassment  and
direct discrimination, but this is likely to change soon in light of the ECJ’s  ruling  that  the  parent
‘Framework’ Directive 2000/78/EC should be read to impose the broad version.[ii]
The significance of the broad definition is that it  extends  the  coverage  to  harassment  or
discrimination on the ground of a third party’s protected status, and to ‘perceived’ discrimination.
‘Third party’ discrimination itself covers two scenarios. First, an employer may  discipline
a white manager for  refusing  to  obey  an  instruction  to  discriminate  against  black  customers:
Showboat Entertainment Centre v Owens.[iii] Second, a worker may be harassed or  discriminated
against by association, for instance, because white woman has  a  black  husband,  or  because  her
son is gay, or has a disability.[iv]
‘Perceived  discrimination’  occurs  where  an  employer  discriminates  against   a   person
because he  assumes,  or  perceives,  incorrectly,  that  the  person  belongs  to  a  protected  group.
Examples would include an Asian worker harassed on the mistaken ground that he is Muslim, or a
straight man harassed on the mistaken ground he is gay.
The  third,  hybrid,  definition   applies   to   religion   or   belief   discrimination   (but   not
harassment). Regulation 5 of the Employment Equality (Religion or  Belief)  Regulations  2003[v]
uses the formula ‘on grounds of the religion or belief of [the  claimant]  or  of  any  other  person’.
This covers third party discrimination, but not perceived discrimination. It was extended  to  cover
perceived discrimination for the supply of goods and services  (but  not  employment),  by  adding
the phrase: ‘a reference to a person’s religion or belief includes a reference to a  religion  or  belief
to which he is thought to belong or subscribe’: Equality Act 2006, s 45(2)).
This hybrid formula was deployed because the standard formula had the potential to  cover
the  scenario  where  an  employer  discriminates  because  of  his  own  religion,  for  instance,  by
refusing to hire homosexuals, which is a matter appropriate for the Sexual Orientation Regulations
2003.[vi] It is harder to imagine the narrow definition of sex discrimination causing problems. But
there are possibilities. It excludes, for instance, instructions to a barman not to serve women at the
bar.
THE CASES
The broad definition  triggered  an  unintended  claim  in  Redfearn  v  Serco  (t/a  West  Yorkshire
Transport Service)[vii] where a driver, whose passengers were 70-80% Asian, was  dismissed  for
being a member of the British National Party (an all-white racist  political  party).  The  EAT  held
that he was dismissed on racial grounds  (i.e.  his  racial  views).  The  Court  of  Appeal  reversed,
Mummery LJ stating that the logical conclusion  of  Redfearn’s  argument  was  that  an  employer
dismissing a worker for serious racial harassment would be treating him less favourably ‘on  racial
grounds’, which was not the aim of the Act.[viii] On the matter of strict interpretation,  Mummery
LJ found that Redfearn was not dismissed on racial grounds.  Instead,  ‘he  was  dismissed  on  the
ground of a particular non-racial characteristic shared by him with a tiny proportion  of  the  white
population, that is membership of ... a political party like the BNP’.[ix]
             More  recently,  the  Court  of  Appeal  was  again  invited  to  rule   on   perhaps   another
unforeseen scenario. In English v Sanderson[x] the issue was whether someone could be liable for
harassment ‘on  grounds of’ sexual orientation, under Regulation 5  of  the  Employment  Equality
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003,[xi] when  the  treatment  was  unrelated  to  any  particular
person’s  sexual  orientation.  Mr  English  was  harassed  by  colleagues  using  sexual   innuendo
suggesting he was homosexual. This conduct was rooted, apparently,  in  two  things:  he  lived  in
Brighton (a well known centre of the gay scene) and had  attended  boarding  school.  What  made
this case unusual was not that  Mr  English  is  heterosexual,  but  because  his  tormentors  neither
assumed nor perceived Mr English to be gay, and that Mr English was aware  throughout  that  his
tormentors never mistook him for being homosexual. The  Court  of  Appeal,  by  a  2-1  majority,
found that  the  mockery  amounted  to  unlawful  harassment  on  grounds  of  sexual  orientation,
reversing the decisions of the EAT and the employment tribunal.
Quite  clearly,  the  phrase  ‘on  grounds  of  sexual  orientation’  lends  itself  to  cover  the
scenario where the harassment was unrelated to  any  person’s  sexual  orientation.  As  Sedley  LJ
observed, the distance between perceived harassment and harassing a man as if he were gay  when
he  is  not  ‘is  barely  perceptible’.[xii]  However,  policy  considerations  were  prevalent  in   the
speeches. Sedley LJ reasoned:
[People] ...  may desire to keep their orientation to themselves but still be vulnerable to harassment by people
who know or sense what their orientation is. It cannot possibly have been the intention, when legislation was
introduced to stop sexual harassment in the workplace, that  such  a  claimant  must  declare  his  or  her  true
sexual orientation in order to establish that the abuse was  ‘on  grounds  of  sexual  orientation’.  ...  The  case
would have been exactly the same if Mr English had elected, for whatever reason, to remain silent  about  his
actual sexual orientation .... And the same would be the case if he were actually gay or bisexual but preferred
not to disclose it. [xiii]
Collins LJ considered the logical conclusion of the defendant’s case: ‘it would follow ...that if  the
claimant is actually homosexual, but those who victimise him do not in fact believe him to  be  so,
then Regulation 5(1) would not be engaged.’[xiv]  He  did  not  consider  this  outcome  to  be  the
intent or policy of the legislation.
The  underlying  policy  consideration  in  both  speeches  is  to   protect   homosexual   (or
bisexual) workers from being ‘outed’ by a systematic  campaign  of  abuse.  In  such  a  pernicious
scenario, the worker would have to suffer the abuse in silence unless  or  until  he  ‘came  out’.  As
such, this decision helps preserve the dignity of workers  that  discrimination  law  is  supposed  to
enshrine. However, the outcome  is  relevant  to  any  of  the  statutory  definitions  employing  the
phrase on  the  ground  of’,  such  as  harassment  and  direct  discrimination,  on  grounds  of  sex,
religion or belief, race, age and disability, and gender reassignment.
Laws LJ dissented. He considered that the purpose of the domestic and EC  legislation  did
not extend beyond the case where someone’s ‘condition’ was involved. Thus the ‘extended’  cases
‘Showboat here, Coleman in Luxembourg - are all connected with someone’s actual, perceived  or
assumed condition’.[xv] The logic of the claimant’s argument applies to all the protected grounds,
and  this  ‘would  amount  not  to  a  Pandora’s   box,   but   a   Pandora’s   attic   of   unpredictable
prohibitions’.[xvi] For Laws LJ, Showboat and Coleman had taken the  definition  to  its  intended
limit.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In  addition  to  harassment  on  protected  grounds,  sexual   harassment   is   unlawful.   The   Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, section 4A, prohibits ‘conduct of a sexual nature that has the purpose  or
effect of violating her dignity or, of creating  an  intimidating,  hostile,  degrading,  humiliating  or
offensive environment for her ...’
Although this is provided by the Sex Discrimination Act, its scope is not limited to male-to-
female conduct, or the reverse. The perpetrator is ‘a person’ while the victim  is  ‘her’,  which  can
be interchanged with ‘him’.[xvii] Thus ‘same-sex’, and more specifically,  ‘male-to-male’,  sexual
harassment  is  caught  by  this  provision.  Thus,  even  before  the  English  decision,  victims   of
sexual harassment were under no obligation to reveal their sexual orientation.
The abuse of Mr English included ‘sexual innuendo’ and ‘lurid  comments’,[xviii]  and  so
he could have claimed for sexual harassment. No mention of this apparent oversight was  made  in
the judgments of the Court of  Appeal  or  the  EAT.  Indeed,  Sedley  LJ  (see  the  extract  above)
appeared to confuse sexual harassment with harassment on the ground of sexual orientation.
A vivid and somewhat graphic example of  ‘male-to-male’  sexual  harassment  led  to  the
important US sexual harassment case, Oncale  v  Sundowner  Offshore  Services.[xix]  The  events
occurred  on  an  offshore  oil  rig,  where  all  the  workers  were  male,  and  included:  threats  of
homosexual rape; two colleagues restraining the victim while a third placed his penis on  his  neck
and another time, on his arm; in the showers forcing a bar of soap into the victim’s anus.  The  US
Supreme Court held that ‘same-sex’ sexual harassment was actionable as sex discrimination under
the Civil Rights Act 1964. The fact that the harassers did not believe the  victim  was  homosexual
was irrelevant. What mattered was that conduct of a sexual nature  created  a  hostile  environment
for the victim.
That said, not all cases of  homophobic  abuse  will  be  caught  by  the  sexual  harassment
provision and so regulation 5 of the Sexual Orientation Regulations 2003 is not  redundant.  There
will be cases of homophobic harassment not of a sexual nature,  such  as  comments  aimed  at  the
victim’s  effeminate  deportment,  or  particular  dress  sense,  or  taste  in  the   arts,   and   so   on.
English remains relevant to such cases.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENGLISH
The far-reaching implications feared in Laws’ LJ dissent are not necessarily beyond  the  intent  of
the  legislation.  Collins  LJ  considered  that  a  parallel  case   of   racial   harassment   should   be
actionable:
... where an employee is repeatedly and offensively called a Paki or a Jew-boy even when he is not  of  Asian
or Jewish origin, and even  when  his  tormentors  do  not  believe  that  he  is,  that  conduct  can  amount  to
harassment for the purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976.[xx]
Similarly, a white worker born in India of British white parents may be mocked as a ‘Paki’.
This of course would extend to harassment on the ground of religion or  belief.  Curiously,
Collins LJ considered that this did not extend to the Disability Discrimination  Act  1995,  because
its narrow definition  excluded  the  case  of  ‘an  able-bodied  but  clumsy  person  being  called  a
“spastic”’.[xxi] In light of the ECJ judgment in Coleman (above) this is highly questionable. If,  to
accord with the ruling in Coleman, the DDA 1995 were amended with the ‘broad’ definition,  then
such cases would be caught on the logic of English. The policy underlying English  suggests  it  is
unlawful for someone with an undeclared disability to be ‘outed’ by harassment.
To  complicate  matters  further,  the  same  argument  applies  to  the  grounds  of   gender
reassignment and age, where the narrow definition appears  similarly  to  be  out  of  line  with  the
Framework Directive. If these formulas were  redefined  with  the  broad  definition,  ‘transsexual’
abuse (even if not of a sexual nature) for no apparent reason would become  actionable,  as  would
‘softer’ or less pernicious cases such as ageist abuse of a young person who is particularly slow  at
some tasks, would be covered.
English has caused some uncertainty, but not so much because of the liberal  interpretation
of the legislation, but more because of the discrepancies between the EC and domestic  definitions
of harassment for gender reassignment, age, disability, and religion or belief.
Parliament  could  opt  for  a  more  precise  definition,  by   specifying   ‘third-party’   and
‘perceived’ discrimination  (see  the  Equality  Act  2006,  above)  and  make  the  statutory  intent
explicit. Two  difficulties  would  arise  from  this.  First,  it  would  place  some  claimants  in  the
position of having to reveal their sexual orientation in order to bring  a  claim;  a  consideration  at
the heart of the majority decision.  Second,  given  this  consideration,  it  is  doubtful  that  such  a
restriction would comply with the parent Directives.
THE REDFEARN DECISION REVISITED
Although they accepted Redfearn as good law and correct  on  policy  grounds,  in  English,  Laws
and Sedley LJJ shared ‘unease’ with the reasoning of Redfearn. Laws LJ found it ‘difficult to  see’
that the reason for Redfearn’s  dismissal  was  anything  other  than  the  race  of  most  of  Serco’s
customers and many of its employees.[xxii] Even Mummery’s LJ policy reasoning (above)  is  not
watertight. There is a difference between racist conduct at work and publicly held views which are
not manifested at work.
However, these doubts should not be used validate racial discrimination  claims  rooted  in
BNP (or similar) membership. Public policy is a well-established tool of statutory interpretation in
English law. It is conceivable that Redfearn - a  ‘satisfactory’  worker  who  did  not  manifest  his
views at work - was unfairly dismissed.[xxiii] But it would be against public  policy  principle  for
the Race Relations Act to come to a person’s aid because he was a racist, just as  it  would  for  an
inheritance statute to favour a son who murdered his mother:
The principle ... must be so far regarded in the construction of Acts of Parliament that  general  words  which
might include cases obnoxious to the principle must be read and construed as subject to it.[xxiv]
This is a long-established  tool  of  statutory  interpretation.  Thus,  technical  qualms  with
Redfearn  should  in  no  way  cast  doubt  over   its   correctness.   Of   course,   European-derived
purposive  interpretation  would  provide  the  same  result,  which  reinforces  the  correctness   of
Redfearn.
CONCLUSION
The  most  obvious  principle  to  emerge  from  the  English  decision  is  that  victims  of   sexual
orientation harassment are under no  obligation  to  disclose  their  sexual  orientation  to  succeed.
Thus, workers cannot be ‘outed’ by a  campaign  of  harassment.   Accordingly,  victims  of  racial
harassment should not be obliged to disclose their race, and so  on.  Second,  although  a  claim  of
sexual harassment appeared to be more appropriate, English establishes this principle  even  where
the conduct is not of a sexual  nature.  Third,  the  doubts  raised  over  the  Redfearn  decision  are
misplaced.   Redfearn   is   perfectly   consistent   with   long-standing    principles    of    statutory
interpretation. What  emerges  from  both  cases  is  that  the  outcomes  are  rooted  in  policy  and
purpose rather than the precise statutory formulas.
More broadly, the cases draw attention to the numerous possibilities when  defining  direct
discrimination and harassment. They  could  be  restricted  to  the  claimant’s  protected  status,  or
extended to cover perhaps, instructions to discriminate, discrimination  by  association,  perceived
discrimination, and conduct unrelated to any particular person’s condition. These varieties  appear
inconsistently and incoherently across the domestic legislation.  Further,  those  definitions  falling
short  of  the  broadest  possibility  confirmed  in  English,  fall  short  of  the   consistently   broad
definition provided by the parent EC Directives.
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